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ABSTRACT
Hidden Markov Models for Malware Classification
by Chinmayee Annachhatre
Malware is a software which is developed for malicious intent. Malware is a
rapidly evolving threat to the computing community. Although many techniques for
malware classification have been proposed, there is still the lack of a comprehensible
and useful taxonomy to classify malware samples.
Previous research has shown that hidden Markov model (HMM) analysis is useful
for detecting certain types of malware. In this research, we consider the related
problem of malware classification based on HMMs. We train HMMs for a variety of
malware generators and a variety of compilers. More than 9000 malware samples are
then scored against each of these models and the malware samples are separated into
clusters based on the resulting scores. We analyze the clusters and show that they
correspond to certain characteristics of malware. These results indicate that HMMs
are an effective tool for the challenging task of automatically classifying malware.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malicious software is called malware. Malware can steal sensitive data from a
computer or it can infect files one after the other one file, then another, and spread the
infection throughout the computer. Malware needs to be caught and removed from the
infected computer in time to avoid the leakage of sensitive data or any other malicious
activity in the computer. In recent years smartphones have started to become more
popular and are one of the preferred devices for most consumers across the world. The
widespread use of smartphones along with continuous internet connectivity and the
“always on” paradigm makes them a lucrative target for malware attacks. Malware
includes all families of viruses, computer worms, Trojans, backdoor, spyware, adware,
etc. See Chapter 2 for more details. According to [43], “malware or malicious code is a
rapidly evolving threat to the computing community. Zero-day malware are exploiting
vulnerabilities very soon after being discovered and are spreading quickly. However,
anti-virus tools, which are the most widely used countering mechanism, are unable
to cope with this. They are based on signatures which need to be computed for new
malware strains. After a new malware strikes and before the signature is found, there
is a sufficient time for the malware to perform its damage.” Hackers fine-tune their
malware against antivirus software and make their code harder to detect. Various
alternative malware detection techniques are also available. These are elaborated in
Chapter 2. By far, there are many techniques proposed for malware classification.
However, there is still the lack of a comprehensible and useful taxonomy to classify
malware samples. We have dealt with the problem of malware classification in this
project.
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Malware authors and distributors have been taking advantage of exploit kits
in order to spread malware rapidly. By far, blackhole is the most significant and
the leading exploit kit [16]. The Blackhole Exploit Kit is one of the most popular
attack tools used to infect Web users with malware. Its purpose is to deliver a
malicious payload to a victim’s computer. The users are redirected from compromised
websites to Blackhole landing pages hosted on malicious servers to install malware on
computers with vulnerable software [16].
One of the world’s most sophisticated malware worm, Stuxnet, was discovered
in June 2010 targeting industrial control systems. It was created to attack Iran’s
nuclear facilities. It initially spreads through Microsoft Windows and targets Siemens
industrial control systems. Its main aim was to reprogram the industrial control
systems in a stealthy way in order to cause damage. It utilized zero-day exploits,
a Windows and a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit, antivirus evasion,
process injection and hooking techniques, network spreading, updates using P2P and
a command and control interface [45].
Koobface is a multi-platform computer worm that originally targets users of so-
cial networking websites like Facebook, Skype, Twitter, hi5 etc. It gathers login
information for such sites [5]. It does not collect any sensitive financial data [44].
The Koobface threat comprises several component malware files that work together
to form and maintain the Koobface botnet. This threat model enables Koobface to
update its existing components on an affected system, add new ones or stop updat-
ing nonworking modules [5]. Koobface cleverly uses social networking sites’ internet
cookies to identify what sites an affected user is a member of in order to access the
user’s social network account and to send Koobface-related messages on the affected
social-networking site [5].
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This shows that malware is a very serious threat that is expanding rapidly day-by-
day. However, there is still a lack of comprehensible and useful taxonomy to classify
malware. Malware taxonomy is useful in several ways. Firstly, it can allow faster
response to new threats – If the new malware can fit in the existing classification, the
anti-malware detection and removal are already known. Hence, the new malware can
be removed with the known techniques. If it does not fit into the existing classification,
the known techniques of malware detection and removal will not work. Hence, the
new techniques need to be found out [2]. Secondly, malware taxonomy helps in better
understanding of malware activities. It might help us in knowing the functionality of
the malware and their relationship with other malware. In this research, we attempt
to resolve the problem of malware classification based on HMMs. Our technique is
inspired by the approach followed in [3]. We train HMMs for a variety of malware
generators and a variety of compilers. More than 9000 malware samples are then
scored against each of these models and the malware samples are separated into
clusters based on the resulting scores. We analyze the clusters and show that they
correspond to certain characteristics of malware. These results indicate that HMMs
are an effective tool for the challenging task of automatically classifying malware.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 includes definitions and information
on the types of malware and different malware detection strategies. Chapter 3 gives
an overview of the previous work on the malware classification. Chapter 4 explains
the k-means clustering algorithm and other alternatives available. Chapter 5 includes
the implementation of k-means clustering algorithm used for malware classification
in detail. Chapter 6 includes the experiments and results, and the benefits of the
clustering method. Chapter 7 ends with the conclusion and suggests future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Malware and Detection Techniques
2.1 Malware
As mentioned in Chapter 1, malware is a software program developed to perform
malicious activities on a computer. There can be any reasons for writing malware
varying from simple pranks to serious organized internet crimes. The early infectious
programs (also the first Internet Worm, Morris Worm) were written as pranks [30].
Now-a-days, malware is widely used to steal confidential personal, financial, business
information. Figure 1 shows how the malware is rapidly increasing in volume day-by-
day. The x-axis in Figure 1 indicates the year and the y-axis indicates the number of
malware samples generated in the specified year on the x-axis.
Figure 1: Malware Growth [33]
As mentioned in Chapter 1, malware includes all families of viruses, computer
worms, Trojans, backdoor, spyware, adware etc. A brief overview of different types
of malware is given below:
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2.1.1 Virus
A virus is a type of malware that replicates itself by inserting copies or modified
copies of itself into other programs. They can live anywhere. It can live on the boot
sector. If it lives on the boot sector, it can take control before anything else [26]. As
mentioned in [4], “it establishes itself before any antivirus software starts or operating
system security is enabled.” It can also live in the memory. It can enter the computer
via email, internet or different types of external storage media like flash drives, floppy
disks. As pointed out in [32], “They have the ability to reproduce infecting other files
and programs. When they are run, they are able to carry out a range of annoying or
damaging actions in your computer.” Virus writers constantly modify their software
to evade the detection techniques. The prominent methods to evade the detection
techniques are encryption, polymorphism and metamorphism. These are described
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Simple Virus [13]
2.1.1.1 Encrypted Virus
Antivirus software searches for a signature (a specific bit string) for virus detec-
tion. The simplest method to hide the virus body (signature) is to encrypt it with
different encryption keys. As a result of this, the detection of a virus becomes a
difficult task. The idea of an encrypted virus is to encrypt the signature in order
to evade signature detection. However, it is still possible to search for an encrypted
signature too. Thus, the encrypted virus is not a reliable way of evading signature
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detection. The only part that is constant in the encrypted virus is the decryptor loop.
Antivirus software will exploit this fact for detection, so the next logical development
is to change the decryptor loop’s code with each infection [4]. The figure 3 shows
graphical representation for the encrypted virus.
Figure 3: Encrypted Virus [13]
2.1.1.2 Polymorphic Virus
The above problem of non-decrypted decryptor loop is solved in polymorphism.
The decryptor loop is morphed in each generation. According to [4], “A polymorphic
virus has, for all practical purposes, an infinite number of decryptor loop variations.
Tremor, for example, has almost six billion possible decryptor loops! Polymorphic
viruses clearly can’t be detected by listing all the possible combinations.” The tech-
niques such as emulation can be used for polymorphic virus detection. Figure 4 shows
graphical representation for the polymorphic virus.
Figure 4: Polymorphic Virus [13]
2.1.1.3 Metamorphic Virus
Virus writers modified the malware furthermore to avoid emulation detection.
The metamorphic virus is also called as body polymorphic virus. The appearance of
the virus changes before infecting any system. The detection of a metamorphic virus
is very challenging. The morphed virus has the same functionality but a different
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structure. Hence the detection of metamorphic virus is difficult. Figure 5 shows
graphical representation for the polymorphic virus.
Figure 5: Metamorphic Virus [13]
2.1.2 Worm
A computer worm is a standalone malware computer program that replicates
itself in order to spread to other computers [14]. As pointed out in [40], “worms
are programs that replicate themselves from system to system without the use of a
host file. This is in contrast to viruses, which requires the spreading of an infected
host file.” Worms replicate themselves damaging files, but can reproduce rapidly,
saturating a network and causing it to collapse. Some of the examples of the notorious
worms sent via email are: Navidad, Pretty Park, Happy99, ExploreZip [32].
2.1.3 Trojan
A Trojan is a non-self-replicating type of malware which appears to perform a
desirable function but instead drops a malicious payload [40]. An important difference
between Trojan and a virus is that the Trojan does not replicate itself [40]. They pose
as legitimate programs that users may recognize and want to use [41]. When these
are executed, they install other programs on the computer which can be harmful [32].
The Trojans have the capacity of deleting files, destroying information on the hard
drive, or open a backdoor to the security systems [32]. Some examples of Trojans are
Backdoor, Crack2000, KillCMOS and BetBus [32].
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2.1.4 Trapdoor/Backdoor
A trapdoor/backdoor is a program which bypasses the security check [4]. This
allows a malicious user to carry out actions on the affected computer that can com-
promise user confidentiality or impede the operations carried out [32]. The actions
that backdoor allow malicious users to carry out can be extremely damaging. They
could allow them to delete files or destroy all the information on the hard disk, cap-
ture confidential data and send it out to an external address or open communications
ports, allowing remote control of the computer. Some examples of backdoor are:
Orifice2K.sfx, Bionet.318, Antilam y Subseven.213 [32].
We have not used these families as the target categories for our classification of
malware. The reason for this is that if an unknown malware is classified into these
families, the detection and removal strategies for that particular malware will be not
known, since this classification is too generalized. Even if there are detection and
removal strategies for these families, there is no way of determining this information.
Instead, we used the information for malware family types provided in the dataset.
2.2 Malware Detection Techniques
As malware writers fine-tune their software by making it better to evade signa-
ture detection, the anitivirus companies are improving their detection techniques as
well. The following sections describe the signature based detection, anomaly based
detection and hidden Markov model based detection strategies.
2.2.1 Signature Based Detection
Signature based detection is a simple and most commonly used technique in
antivirus software. They are popular because of accurate detection, simplicity and
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speed [37]. In signature based detection, the scanner scans each executable and looks
for specific string or pattern of bits (signatures). Antivirus software has a database of
signatures for different viruses. By comparing the signature, it detects the virus. The
disadvantage is that only the known malware can be detected. If the signature is not
unknown, malware cannot be detected. The signature file must be kept up to date.
By using simple code obfuscation techniques, malware can easily evade the signature
based detection [34].
2.2.2 Anomaly Based Detection
The problem of detecting new malwares in signature based detection can be
overcome using anomaly based detection. Heuristic methods are implemented to
detect anomalous behavior. This technique comprises of two phases - the training
phase and the detection phase. In the training phase, the model is trained with the
normal behavior. Anything other than the normal behavior is considered as malicious
behavior [17]. However, there can be more false positives in this technique [37].
2.2.3 Hidden Markov Model Based Detection
Hidden Markov models (HMMs) are generally used for statistical pattern anal-
ysis. They can be used in speech recognition, malware detection [35] and biological
sequence analysis [24]. The following sections give an overview of the introduction to
HMM and its usage in detection of malware.
2.2.3.1 Introduction to HMM
A statistical model that has states and known probabilities of the state transitions
is called a Markov model [38]. In such a Markov model, the states are visible to
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the observer. In contrast, a hidden Markov model (HMM) has states that are not
directly observable [35]. HMM is a machine learning technique. HMM acts as a state
machine. Every state is associated with a probability distribution for observing a set
of observation symbols. The transition between the states have fixed probabilities.
We can train an HMM using the observation sequences to represent a set of data [38].
We can match an observation sequence against a trained HMM to determine the
probability of seeing such a sequence. If the probability is high, the observation
sequence is similar to the training sequences. HMMs are used in protein modeling [24].
HMM can also be used to detect certain types of software piracy detection [22]. As
mentioned in [38], the following table shows the notations used in the hidden Markov
models:
T = length of the observation sequence
N = number of states in the model
M = number of distinct observation symbols
Q = distinct states of the Markov Model
V = set of possible observations
A = state transition probability matrix
B = observation probability matrix
pi = initial state distribution
O = observation sequence
A hidden Markov model is defined by the matrices A, B and pi. An HMM is
denoted as λ = (A,B, pi). Figure 6 represents a generic view of a hidden Markov
model.
The following three problems can be solved efficiently using the HMM algorithms:
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Markov process: X0 X1 X2 · · · XT−1-
A -A -A -A
?
B
?
B
?
B
?
B
Observations: O0 O1 O2 · · · OT−1
Figure 6: A Hidden Markov Model [38]
Problem 1: Given a model λ = (A,B, pi) and an observation sequence O, we
need to find P (O|λ). That is, an observation sequence that can be scored to see how
well it fits a given model [38].
Problem 2: Given a model λ = (A,B, pi) and an observation sequence O, we
can determine an optimal state sequence for the Markov model. That is, the most
likely hidden state sequence can be uncovered [38].
Problem 3: Given O, N , M , we can find a model λ that maximizes probability
of O. This is the training of a model in order to best fit an observation sequence [38].
In this project, the algorithms for Problems 1 and 3 are used. First we train an
HMM to represent a set of data, which is in the form of observation sequences. We
have trained the models using a variety of compilers and malware generators. This
is equivalent to using the algorithm for Problem 3. Then the resulting HMM can
be used to score the malware samples against the model. This is equivalent to using
the algorithm for Problem 1. These three problems can be efficiently solved by the
following three algorithms:
• The Forward algorithm.
• The Backward algorithm.
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• The Baum-Welch reestimation algorithm.
The forward-backward algorithm is for calculating the probability of being in a state
qi at time t given an observation sequence O [38]. The forward algorithm, or α pass,
determines P (O|λ) [38]. The algorithm can be stated as follows.
1. For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1
2. αt(i) = P (O0,O1, . . . ,Ot, xt = qi|λ)
The probability of the partial observation sequence up to time t is αt(i). Using the
forward algorithm, P (O|λ) can be computed as follows [38].
1. Let α0(i) = piibi(O0), for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1
2. For t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 compute
αt(i) =
N−1∑
j=1
αt−1(j)aij)bi(Ot)
3. Then P (O|λ) = (∑N−1i=0 αT−1(i)
The backward algorithm helps to find a most likely optimal state sequence. This
algorithm can be stated as follows [38].
1. For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 define
2. βt(i) = P (Ot+1,Ot+2, . . . ,OT−1, xt = qi, λ)
Then βt(i) can be calculated in following steps [38]:
1. Let βT−1(i) = 1, for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1
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2. For t = T − 2, T − 3, . . . , 0 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
βt(i) =
N−1∑
j=0
aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
For t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2 and i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 define
γt(i) = P (xt = qi|O, λ)
The relevant probability up to time t is given by [38],
γt(i) =
αt(i)βt(i)
P (O|λ)
The most likely state at any time t is the state for which γt(i) is maximum. The
Baum-Welch algorithm helps in iteratively re-estimating the parameters A, B, pi [38].
It provides efficient way to best fit the observations. The number of states N and
number of unique observation symbols M are constant. However, other parameters
like A, B and pi are changeable with row stochastic condition. This process of re-
estimating the model is explained as follows [38]:
1. Initialize λ = (A,B, pi) with an appropriate guess or random values. For exam-
ple pi = 1/N,Aij = 1/N,Bij = 1/M .
2. Compute αt(i), βt(i), γt(i) and γt(i, j) where γt(i, j) is a di-gamma. The di-
gammas can be defined as:
γt(i) =
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
P (O|λ)
γt(i) and γt(i, j) are related by:
γt(i) =
N−1∑
j=0
γt(i, j)
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3. Re-estimate model parameters as: For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 let
pii = γ0(i)
For i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, compute
aij =
T−2∑
t=0
γt(i, j)
T−2∑
t=0
γt(i)
For j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 and k = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1, compute
bj(k) =
∑
t0,1,...,T−1,Ot=k
γt(j)
T−2∑
t=0
γt(j)
4. If P (O|λ) increases go to step 3.
2.2.3.2 HMM For Malware Detection
When an HMM is trained, it can be used to distinguish between a malware and
a benign file [38, 47]. There is a lot of previous work done on the use of HMM for
malware detection. The dataset is tested against the trained models. There is a range
of values of scores for which the scores of the malware and the benign files do not
overlap [36]. This is known as threshold. Using this threshold, the malware can be
distinguished from the benign files [47].
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CHAPTER 3
Related Work
A lot of previous work is done on detection and classification of malware. This
chapter discusses some attempts made for malware classification, which include usage
of structured control workflow and some other data mining methods.
3.1 Classification of Malware using Structured Control Flow
Control flow represents the execution path a program may take. Control flow
information appears in two main forms. The call graph represents the inter-procedural
control flow. The intra-procedural control flow is represented as a set of control flow
graphs with one graph per procedure [9]. In [9], the research has shown that malware
can be effectively be characterized by its control flow. The authors have proposed a
malware classification system using approximate matching of control flow graphs. The
string edit distances can be calculated between the control flow signatures and the
structured graphs of the malware in the database. The threshold is decided. If the edit
distance exceeds a particular threshold, then the binary can be classified as a malicious
binary, else it is a benign binary. Control flow is more invariant among polymorphic
and metamorphic malware. The research shows that the proposed method could
successfully identify variants of malware [9].
3.2 Behavioral Malware Classification
Classification systems generally fall into one of two categories: Those that rely
on features extracted from static files, or those that execute malware and use behav-
ioral features to classify malware. Static approaches sometimes use low-level features
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such as calls to external libraries, strings, and byte sequences for classification [23].
Other static approaches extract more detailed information from binaries, including
sequences of API calls, the graphical representations of control flow [9]. Although the
many variants in a malware family have different static signatures, they share char-
acteristic behavioral patterns resulting from their common function and heritage [8].
The authors in [8] have described a automatic classification system that can be trained
to accurately identify new variants within known malware families, using observed
similarities in behavioral features extracted from sensors monitoring live computer
hosts. In the feature selection used in [8], the authors have selected a set of observ-
able features that are easily extracted from live computer hosts, and whose values can
be used to infer whether a detected malware sample belongs to particular category or
family. The authors have considered the following features: the data collected from
performance monitors that report resource usage, the frequency of calls to specific
kernel functions, and the frequency of calls to specific sequences of kernel functions.
The system proposed by authors uses decision trees for classification, which label each
newly detected malware sample as one of the existing labels learned during training.
If a new malware sample does not belong to one of the existing labels, the decision
trees simply label it (incorrectly) with one of the existing labels. To address the issue
of new malware samples that are not well-described by an existing label, the authors
have used other types of classifiers. They have explored the use of the nearest centroid
algorithm [49], which can be used to establish a notion of distance from the centroids
that define the labels. If the malware whose distance to the closest centroid exceeded
a threshold, it might be considered new malware that required further analysis. The
authors used k-means clustering algorithm [7] to deal with the behavioral diversity
of malware having a particular label to establish multiple centroids for characterizing
each malware label and also exploring the use of subfamily labels for classification.
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The presented results indicate that the behavioral classifier can correctly identify new
malware variants within certain families of malware.
3.3 Malware Classification using the data mining methods
In [23], the authors have extracted the byte sequences from the executables,
converting these into n-grams, and constructed several classifiers: instance-based
learner, Na¨ıve Bayes, decision trees, support vector machines and boosting. They
viewed each n-grams as a Boolean attribute that is either present in (i.e., T) or
absent from (i.e., F) the executable. They have shown that the boosted decision trees
outperformed the other methods. The following section shows the methods used in
their research.
3.3.1 Instance-based Learner
One of the simplest learning methods is the instance-based (IB) learner [1]. Its
concept description is a collection of training examples or instances. Learning, there-
fore, is the addition of new examples to the collection. An example is found in the
collection that is most similar to the unknown and the examples class label is returned
as its prediction for the unknown. The authors have used the number of values the
two instances have in common as the measure of similarity. In the variation of this
method, such as IBk, the k most similar instances are found and the majority vote
of their class labels is returned as the prediction. Values for k are typically odd to
prevent ties [23]. These are also called as nearest neighbor and k-nearest neighbors.
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3.3.2 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
Support Vector Machines [12] are supervised learning models with associated
learning algorithms that analyze data and recognize patterns, used for classification.
In [23], the authors produce a linear classifier, so its concept description is a vector
of weights, ~w and a threshold, b. SVMs use a kernel function to map training data
into a higher-dimensioned space so that the problem is linearly separable. In a high-
dimensional space, a hyperplane is built and used for classification. The method
predicts the positive class if ~w.~x−b >0 and predicts the negative class otherwise [23]. ~x
is the set of points on the hyperplane. Thus, given a set of training examples belonging
to one of the two categories, an SVM assigns new examples into one category or the
other.
3.3.3 Na¨ıve Bayes
Na¨ıve Bayes is a probabilistic method that has a long history in information
retrieval and text classification [29]. It stores as its concept description the prior
probability of each class, P (Ci), and the conditional probability of each attribute
value given the class, P (vj|Ci). These quantities are estimated by counting in training
data the frequency of occurrence of the classes and the attribute values for each class.
The Bayes rule is used to compute the posterior probability of each class given an
unknown instance, returning as its prediction the class with highest such value [23].
3.3.4 Decision Trees
The decision trees are built based on the training data. The internal nodes of a
decision tree correspond to attributes and leaf nodes correspond to class labels. The
performance element uses the attributes and their values of an instance to traverse the
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tree from the root to a leaf. It predicts the class label of the leaf node [23]. It creates
a node, branches, and children for the attribute and its values, removes the attribute
from further consideration, and distributes the examples to the appropriate child
node. This process repeats recursively until a node contains examples of the same
class, at which point, it stores the class label [23]. In an effort to reduce over training,
most implementations also prune induced decision trees by removing subtrees that
are likely to perform poorly on test data [23]. The malware classification based on
the decision trees is very fast and also accurate. The disadvantage of the decision
trees is that an error in higher level of the tree may cause an error in the lower part
of the tree [48].
3.3.5 Boosted Classifiers
Boosting [15] is a method for combining multiple classifiers. A set of weighted
models are produced by iteratively learning a model from a weighted dataset. The
generated model is then evaluated. The dataset is reweighted based upon the model’s
performance [23]. The authors have provided a method of detecting unknown mali-
cious code in executables using machine learning. They have extracted byte sequences
from the executables, converted these into n-grams, and constructed several classi-
fiers: na¨ıve Bayes, boosted SVMs and boosted decision trees. The results of their
experiments have shown that the boosted decision trees outperformed other methods
and achieved a true-positive rate of 0.98 and a false-positive rate of 0.05.
3.4 VILO: A Rapid Learning Nearest-Neighbor Classifier for Malware
Classification
There are two different types of malware classification possible: binary and famil-
ial: In the binary malware classification problem, an unknown executable is classified
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as either being malicious or benign. Conversely, in the familial malware classification
problem, a malicious executable is classified as belonging to a particular group of mal-
ware [25]. In [25], the work is based upon the familial malware classification. VILO
makes use of three components: N-perm feature vectors, Term Frequency X Inverse
Document Frequency (TFIDF) weighting of features [20], and the nearest-neighbor
algorithm. N-perms are obtained by sliding a window of size n over bytes, opcodes of
n-grams. They are robust against some code obfuscations such as instruction reorder-
ing [11]. VILO implements a nearest neighbor algorithm with similarities computed
over TFIDF weighted opcode mnemonic permutation features (N-perms). The results
in [25] showed that VILO is a quick and efficacious learner of real-world malware.
TFIDF weighting of features ensures that features that are common across many
types of executables are not overly emphasized [25]. This is suitable for constantly
changing malware population. Nearest neighbor search does not require construction
of a classification model and hence is very simple and effective [25]. The authors have
also stated that VILO is not suitable for binary malware classification.
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CHAPTER 4
Clustering Algorithms
Clustering is the process of classifying objects into subsets based on similarity
in the context of a particular problem. The objects are thereby organized into a
representation that characterizes the collection being sampled. The following section
discusses the different methods of clustering [19].
• Exclusive versus non-exclusive: An exclusive classification is a partition of
the set of objects. Each object belongs to exactly one subset, or cluster. Non-
exclusive classification, also called overlapping classification, is the alternative
in which an object can be assigned to several clusters [19].
• Intrinsic versus extrinsic: Depending on whether category labels are present
on the objects being classified, there are two types (intrinsic and extrinsic clas-
sification). Intrinsic classification only uses a proximity matrix to perform the
classification. Intrinsic classification is called “unsupervised learning” because
no labels are used for classifying the object [19]. Extrinsic classification uti-
lizes category labels on the object [19]. Extrinsic classification is also called
“supervised learning.”
• Hierarchical versus Partitional: Hierarchical clustering algorithms break
up the data into a hierarchy of clusters, whereas partitional algorithms divide
the data set into mutually disjoint partitions [18]. Hierarchical clustering algo-
rithms produce a hierarchy of clusters called as a dendrogram either by merging
smaller clusters into larger ones or dividing larger clusters to smaller ones [18].
Hierarchical clustering algorithms are further divided into following two types:
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– Agglomerative: Initially, each point is considered as a cluster in itself. The
two “nearest” clusters clusters are combined into one cluster repeatedly
until all the clusters are merged into a single cluster . This is a “bottom
up” approach.
– Divisive: All observations start in one cluster, and splits are performed re-
cursively as one moves down the hierarchy. This is a “top down” approach.
Partitional clustering algorithms generate various partitions and then evaluate
them by some criterion [18]. They are also called non-hierarchical as each
data point is placed in exactly one of k mutually exclusive clusters. One of
the most popular partitional clustering algorithms is the k-means clustering
algorithm. The number of clusters k is pre-determined. The algorithm initializes
the centroids for k partitions, and then assigns each member to a cluster based
on its distance from each of the centroids. It then recalculates the centroids
based on newly the formed clusters. The process is repeated until the difference
between the initial and the recalculated centroids is negligible.
There are key differences between hierarchical and partitional clustering [18]:
1. Partitional clustering is faster than hierarchical clustering.
2. Hierarchical clustering requires only a similarity measure, whereas the par-
titional clustering requires the initial centroids/centers and the number of
clusters as well.
4.1 k-means Clustering Algorithm
In this project, the k-means clustering algorithm is used for malware classifica-
tion. This algorithm is one of the simplest unsupervised learning algorithms that
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solves the clustering problem [27]. It classifies the dataset into a certain number of
clusters (say, k), which is pre-determined. k centroids are defined at initialization,
one for each cluster. These centroids may be placed as far as possible from each other.
Once this initialization is complete, each data point in the dataset is associated with
the centroid “nearest” to it and placed in the corresponding cluster. In the next step,
the centroids for each cluster are recalculated depending on the data points that have
been assigned to it. These two steps are repeated until the centroids no longer change,
or until the distance between the initial centroids and the recalculated centroids is
negligible. The Euclidean distance formula is used for the distances calculation. The
algorithm used for this project can be described in 7 steps as shown below. Steps 1
and 2 comprise of the pre-work. Step 3 is the initialization step. Steps 4, 5 and 6 are
the looping steps. Step 6 is the analysis step.
1. Collect the malware dataset.
2. Identify the number of clusters (k).
3. Initialize the k centroids (k-means) for the data, say, c1, c2, . . . , ck. This can be
done in several ways, such as random or uniform distribution on each dimension
of the centroid or by simply selecting one of the data points as a centroid.
4. Determine the distance of each malware from each centroid using Euclidean
distance, and assign each malware to the cluster with the centroid closest to it.
5. Recalculate the centroids for each cluster.
6. Repeat the steps 4 and 5 until there is no (or negligible) change in cluster
centroids.
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7. If the formed clusters do not look reasonable, repeat steps 1-6 for different
number of clusters (different k).
4.1.1 Advantages of the k-means clustering algorithm
The k-means clustering algorithm is simple to implement. Since the distance of
a point from a centroid does not depend on the distance of any other point from any
centroid, these calculations can be done in parallel, thus increasing the overall speed
of execution. Following are the other advantages of k-means clustering algorithm:
1. It is a simple and intuitive clustering algorithm.
2. This algorithm works well for globular clusters.
4.1.2 Disadvantages of the k-means clustering algorithm
Although k-means clustering algorithm is simple and fast and produces tighter
clusters than hierarchical clustering, it has some limitations. Following are the limi-
tations of k-means clustering algorithm:
1. The number of clusters k is required to be specified at the beginning. If this k
is incorrectly guessed, the clusters may not reflect the natural classification of
the data at hand.
2. Different initial values of centroids may produce different clusters. It may there-
fore be necessary to try clustering with different random initializations for clus-
ter centroids.
3. k means does not work well with non-globular clusters (e.g. chains).
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CHAPTER 5
Implementation
This chapter comprises of all the implementation details of the project. The first
section gives information on training HMMs. The second section contains a brief
overview of how the data was collected. The third section gives details about scoring
the dataset. The fifth section is about the implementation of k-means clustering
algorithm in this project.
5.1 Training HMMs
The hidden Markov models were created for four different compilers (GCC,
MinGW, TurboC, Clang), hand-written assembly (TASM), virus construction kit
(NGVCK) and for metamorphic code (MWOR). For each of these models, the whole
dataset was divided into 5 subsets. As mentioned in [36], 4 datasets are used for
training and the fifth subset is used to test the trained HMM model. This process
is repeated varying the number of states from 2 to 6. The training is done for 800
iterations and models are built. This method is known as five-fold cross-validation.
The number of assembly files used in each case is as shown in Table 1.
5.2 Collection of the dataset
Malware datasets are not easily available and this project requires a very sub-
stantial number of malware samples. The dataset was requested from the Malicia
project website [31]. It comprises of 11000+ malware binaries collected from 500
drive-by download servers over a period of 11-months [31]. We have used 9442 mal-
ware samples from this dataset for malware classification. The malware samples are
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Table 1: Count of samples used for the training of HMM
Type Count
GCC 75
Clang 72
TurboC 64
MinGW 72
MWOR 100
NGVCK 50
TASM 56
of EXE or DLL format. These are disassembled using the objdump command. Af-
ter disassembling, these files are used for scoring against the HMMs implemented
in 5.1. In addition to the malware binaries, the data that we received also contained
a MySQL database with metadata that included information on when the malware
was collected, where the malware was collected from and the classification of the
malware. This database helped us realize that the clusters (after classification of
the dataset into clusters using k-means clustering algorithm) actually correspond to
certain characteristics of the malware.
5.3 Scoring the dataset
After training, a model should assign high probabilities to files similar to the
training dataset and low probabilities to all other files. We computed the log likelihood
of the malware samples. Log likelihood is strongly length dependent, since it is a sum
of log transition probabilities and log observation probabilities. A longer sequence
will naturally have more transitions and more observations and thus a greater log
likelihood, independent of how similar it is to the training sequences. Because the
sequences in the dataset may have different lengths, we divided the log likelihood of
a sequence by the sequence length (which is the number of opcodes) to obtain the log
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likelihood per opcode (LLPO), which adjusts for the length difference. This LLPO
is the score of the sequence [47]. Since we used five-fold cross validation during the
training phase, we have 25 models each for the 4 compilers (GCC, MINGW, CLANG
and TURBOC), the hand-written assembly code (TASM), the metamorphic worm
(MWOR) and the virus construction kit (NGVCK). Each malware sample is scored
against each of the 25 models in every case and then the average score of all the 25
models is taken as the final score for that particular case.
5.4 k-means Clustering Algorithm
Each malware sample is represented as a 7-tuple, where each dimension represents
its score generated by the specific HMM. Suppose the dataset contains n malware
samples, say malware1, malware2,. . .,malwaren. The corresponding 7-tuples for these
malware samples can be shown as in Table 2.
Table 2: Malware Samples in the dataset
Name GCC MinGW TurboC Clang TASM MWOR NGVCK
malware1 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1 g1
malware2 a2 b2 c2 d2 e2 f2 g2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
malwaren an bn cn dn en fn gn
In Table 2, a1, a2, . . ., an correspond to the GCC scores, b1, b2, . . ., bn correspond
to the MinGW scores, c1, c2, . . ., cn correspond to the TurboC scores, d1, d2, . . ., dn
are the Clang scores of n malware samples, e1, e2, . . ., en are the TASM scores, f1, f2,
. . ., fn are the MWOR scores and g1, g2, . . ., gn correspond to the NGVCK scores.
The range of each dimension of the dataset is divided into k parts. Since all
the malware samples in a cluster are 7-tuples (7-dimensional), the centroid for each
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cluster is also a 7-tuple. For every cluster, the mean is computed for each dimension.
Table 3 represents the centroid, i.e., the 7-tuple with the mean values thus computed.
The mean of scores in the first dimension of the first cluster is given by:
amean =
(a1 + a2 + ....+ an/k)
n/k
Similarly, means for all the other dimensions are calculated. The resulting 7-tuple is
considered the centroid for that corresponding cluster. The centroids for all k clusters
are computed in this manner. These represent the initial centroids of the dataset.
In the next step, the distance of each malware sample with each of the k centroids
is calculated. Each malware sample is placed in the cluster for which its distance with
the centroid of that cluster is minimum. After all the malware has been assigned
to a cluster, the new mean values (7-tuple) for all k centroids are recalculated by
computing the average of each dimension of all malware points in that cluster. This
process continues till no point moves between clusters between 2 iterations, or the
distance between the old centroids and the new centroids is negligible. One sample
record in the dataset is shown in Table 4.
Table 3: 7-tuple of a centroid
Name GCC MinGW TurboC Clang TASM MWOR NGVCK
centroid amean bmean cmean dmean emean fmean gmean
Table 4: Sample record in the dataset
Name GCC MinGW TurboC Clang TASM MWOR NGVCK Cluster
Num -462.91 -384.06 -235.18 -444.97 -197.49 -708.39 -334.51 0
The Euclidean distance between points p and q is the length of the line
segment connecting them. In Cartesian coordinates, if p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) and
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q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) are two points in Euclidean n-space, then the distance from p
to q, or q to p is given by:
d(p, q) =
√
x1(p1 − q1)2 + x2(p2 − q2)2 + · · ·+ xn(pn − qn)2
where x1, x2, ..., xn are all weight multipliers initialized to 1. These weight multipliers
are included since we may want to weigh some of the individual scores more than
others. They are all left at their default values for now.
The k-means clustering procedure is performed for k = 2 to k = 15. The stacked
column charts are plotted for k = 2 to k = 10, and can be found in appendix A.
5.4.1 Example - Distance Calculation
In this section, we present an example of distance calculation between a malware
sample and a centroid. In Table 5, we provide the data used for the example distance
calculation presented in this section.
Table 5: Example of a malware sample
Name GCC MinGW TurboC Clang TASM MWOR NGVCK
File 1 -430.145 -319.785 -205.8573 -423.8581 -150.8818 -708.3964 -285.6242
Suppose we set the number of clusters, k = 2. Every malware sample is rep-
resented by a 7-tuple as shown in Table 2. The malware sample named “File 1” is
represented by a tuple consisting of its scores from the 7 models – GCC, MinGW,
TurboC, Clang, TASM, MWOR and NGVCK. Now, as per the algorithm for k-means
clustering, we have to initialize k clusters by assigning a value to each dimension of
the 7-tuple using one of several possible methods (random values for each dimension,
all dimensions of a random malware sample, uniformly distributed centroids within
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the range of each dimension, etc). We have two centroids in our example. Suppose
the initial centroids computed by uniformly distributed centroids within the range of
each dimension of the dataset are given in Table 6.
Table 6: Initial centroids
-468.7534 -382.7203 -372.674 -434.2221 -297.1747 -708.3964 -405.1523
-286.6685 -196.3716 -191.1312 -222.1586 -151.7624 -708.3964 -206.146
Once the centroids are initialized, we enter a loop where each malware is assigned
to the cluster corresponding to the centroid closest to it, and then the centroids are
recomputed by taking the mean of each dimension of the malware assigned to it. The
distance between the malware sample in Table 5 and the first centroid in Table 6 is
calculated using the Euclidean distance formula. It evaluates to the following:
d(centroid1,malware sample)
=
√
x1((−430.145)− (−468.7534))2 + · · ·+ x7((−285.6242)− (−405.1523))2
where x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 are all 1. Similarly, the distance between the malware
sample in Table 5 and the second centroid in Table 6 is calculated using the Euclidean
distance formula below:
d(centroid2,malware sample)
=
√
x1((−430.145)− (−286.6685))2 + · · ·+ x7((−285.6242)− (−206.146))2
where x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 are 1.
The distances d(centroid1,malwaresample) and d(centroid2,malwaresample)
are compared. If the distance of the malware sample from the first centroid is less
than its distance from the second centroid, it is placed in the first cluster (other-
wise it is placed in the second cluster, i.e., the cluster with the closest centroid to
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that malware sample). The distance between all malware samples and centroids is
calculated and the malware samples are placed in the corresponding clusters in this
manner. Following this, the centroids for each cluster are recalculated by computing
the average of each dimension of the malware samples in that cluster. This process
continues till no malware moves between centroids or until the distance between the
old centroids and the new centroids is negligible.
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CHAPTER 6
Experiments
This chapter comprises of the setup and the results of the experiments of the
project. The setup section states the specifications of the host and the guest machines.
The second section contains the discussion on the results of the project.
6.1 Setup
In this project, we have used a virtual machine container and we have taken the
snapshots of the whole system for recovery purposes. We have used the Oracle VM
VirtualBox to get score the malware samples. The following are the specifications of
the host and the guest machine:
Host:
• Model: Sony Vaio T15
• Processor: Intel Corei5-3337U, CPU@1.80GHz
• RAM: 4.00GB
• System type: 64-bit OS
• Operating System: Windows 8
Guest:
• Software: Oracle VirtualBox 4.2.18 VMs
• Base memory: 1000MB
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• System type: 64bit OS
• Operating System: Linux Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS
The training of HMMs is done using the host machine. The malware samples are
scored on the guest machine. The k-means clustering is performed on the host ma-
chine.
6.2 Discussion on Results
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in addition to the malware binaries, the data that
we received also contained the MySQL database with all metadata including when
the malware was collected, from where the malware was collected and the malware
classification. We have taken into consideration the family type of the malware for
our project. The stacked column charts are plotted for number of files of each family
type versus clusters. Some of the malware samples in the dataset had its family type
as a null value. We have filtered out these samples in order to get a better clustering.
6.2.1 Classification and Clustering
It can be seen that there are three dominant family types in the dataset: Win-
websec, Zbot and Zeroaccess. These family types are distinctly seen in three different
clusters in the stacked column chart. The family type Winwebsec dominates in Clus-
ter 6. The family type Zbot dominates in Cluster 4. The family type Zeroaccess
dominates in Cluster 3. Of all the stacked column charts drawn, though the family
types are distinctly seen in the clusters for k = 9. Thus, as per the results, the
dataset can be divided into three major clusters, as shown in Figure A.16. From the
results in Figure A.16, we obtain the graphs in Figure 8. Clearly, the Winwebsec
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Figure 7: Stacked Column Chart for 9 Clusters
Figure 8: Stacked Column Chart for 9 Clusters
family type has malware samples from Cluster 6, the Zbot family type has malware
samples from Cluster 4 and the Zeroaccess family type has the malware samples from
Cluster 3. The functionality and details of these three clusters corresponding to the
malware family types in the decreasing order of their dominance in the dataset can
34
be explained as follows:
• Cluster 6: Most of the malware samples that fall in the cluster are of type
Winwebsec. As described in [46], “Winwebsec is a category of malware that
attacks the users of Windows operating system and produce fake claims as gen-
uine anti-malware softwares. They show pop-ups that claim to scan for malware
and displays fake warnings similar to 32 Virus and Trojans Detected on your
computer. Click on Fix Now button to clean these threats. They then show
a message to the user that they need to pay money to activate the software
in order to remove these threats which actually doesn’t exist. These malware
may display a dialog that looks similar to Windows Security Center or it may
have names like Live Security Platinum or Security Shield. The GUI varies
from variant to variant.” Winwebsec programs generate misleading alerts and
false detections in order to convince users to purchase illegitimate security soft-
ware [46]. They may also display logos or product names of some well known
companies like Microsoft.
• Cluster 4: The second most dominant type in the dataset is Zbot. As described
in [28], “Zbot is family of Trojans can steal your personal information and
give a hacker access and control of your PC. They can also lower your internet
browser security and turn off your firewall. They can be installed on your PC via
spam emails and hacked websites, or packaged with other malware families.” It
specifically targets system information, online credentials, and banking details,
but can be customized through the toolkit to gather any sort of information.
This is done by tailoring configuration files that are compiled into the Trojan
installer by the attacker [39].
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• Cluster 3: The third type which has its dominance in the dataset is Zeroaccess.
As per [42], Trojan.Zeroaccess is a Trojan horse that uses an advanced rootkit to
hide itself. It can also create a hidden file system, downloads more malware, and
opens a back door on the compromised computer. The threat is also capable of
downloading other threats on to the compromised computer, some of which may
be misleading applications that display bogus information about threats found
on the computer and scare the user into purchasing fake antivirus software to
remove the bogus threats. It is also capable of downloading updates of itself to
improve and/or fix functionality of the threat [42].
The other family types in the dataset are WinRescue, ufasoft-bitcoin, spyeye-
ep, smarthdd, securityshield, russkill, ransom Noaouy, ramnit, harebot, fakeav-
webprotection, fakeav-rena. The number of malware samples of these family types
is very insignificant. In Table 7, we have tabulated the malware distribution in the
dataset for quick reference.
The problem in k-means clustering is that the number of clusters k must be
predetermined. We have performed the experiments for k = 2 to k = 15 and identified
the best case. The clustering might be more accurate when k is more than 15.
6.2.2 Why is clustering important?
There are many benefits of clustering malware. Firstly, the clustering of malware
can allow faster response to new threats – If the new malware can fit in one of the
existing clusters, the anti-malware detection and removal are already known. Hence,
the new malware can be removed with the known techniques. If it does not fit in
one of the clusters, the known techniques of malware detection and removal will not
work. Hence, the new techniques need to be found out [2]. Secondly, the clustering of
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Table 7: Malware Distribution in the dataset
FamilyType NumberOfMalwareSamples
cleaman 32
cridex 74
cutwail 2
dprn 1
fakeav-rena 2
fakeav-webprotection 3
harebot 53
ramnit 4
ransomNoaouy 5
russkill 1
securityshield 58
smarthdd 68
spyeye-ep 5
ufasoft-bitcoin 3
winrescue 5
winwebsec 4361
zbot 2136
zeroaccess 1306
malware helps in better understanding of malware activities – The clustering might
help us in knowing the functionality of the malware and their relationship with other
malware.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, we proposed and evaluated the k-means clustering algorithm
for classifying over 9000 malware samples. We scored the malware samples using
the hidden Markov models for variety of compilers and malware generators (GCC,
MINGW, CLANG, TURBOC, TASM and MWOR). We used these scores as the
input to the k-means clustering algorithm. Experiments were performed varying the
number of clusters from k = 2 to k = 15. We drew the stacked column charts
for all the cases. It was observed that the charts for the case k = 9 proved to be
the best case. The distinction in the family types of the malware in this case was
clearly seen in the clusters. Each cluster corresponds to a specific malware family.
The functionality of the three dominating clusters: Winwebsec, Zbot, Zeroaccess was
described in Chapter 6. The results showed that HMMs are an effective tool for the
challenging task of automatically classifying malware.
In this project, the distances in k-means clustering algorithm are calculated
using the Euclidean distance formula. Some other ways of finding the distance –
the Hamming distance (also called city block and Manhattan distance), Minkowski
distance or cosine distance can be explored in the future work.
The centroid selection of the dataset can be done in a number of ways. In this
project, we have computed the cluster centroid by computing the mean for that clus-
ter. The k initial means are computed within the data domain. The following varia-
tion methods can be tried as a part of the future work: The centroids can be randomly
generated within the data domain. k-medians clustering can be explored, wherein the
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median in each dimension is calculated instead of the mean [10]. k-medoids cluster-
ing can be tried out which calculates the medoid instead of the mean [21]. Fuzzy
C-means Clustering, which is a soft version of k-means, where each data point has a
fuzzy degree belonging to each cluster [6].
In this project, some of the malware samples are very different than the other
malware samples. If we filter out these samples from the dataset, the clustering will
be more accurately done. For this, we can calculate the standard deviation of the
malware dataset and consider only those samples which fall within certain range (say,
95%) of the standard deviation. The clusters generated in this way must be more
meaningful, since the outliers will not be considered.
In this project, we have considered the hidden Markov models for a variety of
compilers and malware generators. For the future work, we can consider using only
the HMMs for a variety of known malware. Going further, we can train the hidden
Markov models for the dominant family types of the malware that exist in the dataset
and see how the clusters are formed.
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APPENDIX
Graphs for k-means Clustering Algorithm for Malware Classification
A.1 k = 2 (Number of Clusters=2)
Figure A.9: Stacked Column Chart for 2 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
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A.2 k = 3 (Number of Clusters=3)
Figure A.10: Stacked Column Chart for 3 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
A.3 k = 4 (Number of Clusters=4)
Figure A.11: Stacked Column Chart for 4 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
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A.4 k = 5 (Number of Clusters=5)
Figure A.12: Stacked Column Chart for 5 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
A.5 k = 6 (Number of Clusters=6)
Figure A.13: Stacked Column Chart for 6 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
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A.6 k = 7 (Number of Clusters=7)
Figure A.14: Stacked Column Chart for 7 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
A.7 k = 8 (Number of Clusters=8)
Figure A.15: Stacked Column Chart for 8 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
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A.8 k = 9 (Number of Clusters=9)
Figure A.16: Stacked Column Chart for 9 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
A.9 k = 10 (Number of Clusters=10)
Figure A.17: Stacked Column Chart for 10 Clusters (Uniformly Spaced Initial Cen-
troids)
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Some more experiments were performed by randomly selecting the initial cen-
troids varying k = 2 to k = 15. It was found that k = 12 and k = 10 are the best
cases. Following are the graphs for these cases:
A.10 k = 2 (Number of Clusters=2)
Figure A.18: Stacked Column Chart for 2 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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A.11 k = 3 (Number of Clusters=3)
Figure A.19: Stacked Column Chart for 3 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
A.12 k = 4 (Number of Clusters=4)
Figure A.20: Stacked Column Chart for 4 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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A.13 k = 5 (Number of Clusters=5)
Figure A.21: Stacked Column Chart for 5 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
A.14 k = 6 (Number of Clusters=6)
Figure A.22: Stacked Column Chart for 6 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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A.15 k = 7 (Number of Clusters=7)
Figure A.23: Stacked Column Chart for 3 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
A.16 k = 8 (Number of Clusters=8)
Figure A.24: Stacked Column Chart for 8 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
52
A.17 k = 9 (Number of Clusters=9)
Figure A.25: Stacked Column Chart for 9 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
A.18 k = 10 (Number of Clusters=10)
Figure A.26: Stacked Column Chart for 10 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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A.19 k = 11 (Number of Clusters=11)
Figure A.27: Stacked Column Chart for 11 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
A.20 k = 12 (Number of Clusters=12)
Figure A.28: Stacked Column Chart for 12 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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A.21 k = 13 (Number of Clusters=13)
Figure A.29: Stacked Column Chart for 13 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
A.22 k = 14 (Number of Clusters=14)
Figure A.30: Stacked Column Chart for 14 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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A.23 k = 15 (Number of Clusters=15)
Figure A.31: Stacked Column Chart for 15 Clusters (Random Initial Centroids)
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